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Tuesday, 12 June 2012

Thoughts on First Round of Euro 2012

As the final whistle blew after Ukraine's two - one win over Sweden and millions of Ukrainians celebrated into the night, the first round of Euro 2012 group stages matches had been completed. Every single team had now played at the tournament, and finally, instead of speculating and predicting line-ups, it is possible to analyse the tactics and styles every team used and also to overview any trends that are emerging at this early stage.

Europe's Problem Position:

The standard of play at the left-back position so far in this tournament has at times been heart-attack inducing. Many left backs have started the tournament poorly: Michal Kadlec, Jose Holebas and Sebastian Boenisch (all coincidentally in the same group). Furthermore there have been no standouts at this position, with perhaps the exception of the classy Yuri Zhirkov, so purposeful on Russian counter-attacks and rarely losing the ball. 

The main issue with the performance of the aforementioned left-backs has been positioning. Whereas Holebas was always found playing too far forward (which is a worry since Blaszczykowski and Piszczek occupy that flank), Kadlec kept getting drawn infield by the Russians, thus leaving the right side susceptible to the barnstorming Dzagoev. Kadlec could be moved to centre back by Michal Bilek, as he seems to be more comfortable there and could form a more potent partnership with Hubnik or Sivok, who struggled to form a solid back line. As is said - two birds, one stone. 

Two Hosts, One Aim:

Both Poland and Ukraine have one aim: to reach the knockout stages. There is a certain pressure on them, as co-hosts, to succeed and perform well. One, however, thrived under the pressure and the other capitulated.

Poland were in a comfortable position as one can find; one - nil up at halftime at home against a team which had been reduced to ten men (thanks to some ludicrous refereeing by Carlos Velasco, who in 19 La Liga games has sent off 16 players). Poland, instead of sensing their advantage and going for the jugular, sat back and were punished by conceding a goal to Greece early in the second half and were almost condemned when the often infallible Karagounis missed a penalty. Poland, in stark contrast to the first half, performed without confidence and crumbled under the demand for success. An easy group draw also doesn't help, as if they do not reach the knockout stages they will be humiliated by millions of expectant fans. 

Ukraine, on the other hand, were at the opposite end of the spectrum. With about forty minutes left of their match with Sweden, Ukraine found themselves one-nil down in silent yet once buzzing national stadium. Lose this game, and Ukraine would almost certainly be looking at a group stage exit. Ukraine, unlike Sweden, didn't capitulate and instead dug themselves out of a hole thanks to two goals from the heroic figure of natural treasure Andriy Shevchenko. Maybe one reason why Ukraine flourished under the pressure unlike their Baltic neighbours was the presence of such key veterans as Shevchenko, Voronin and Tymoshchuk, who all had marvellous games. Poland had to rely on the youthful exuberance of Lewandowski, Blaszczykowski and Szczesny, the latter having been sent off and been at fault for Greece's goal.

Two Dutch Sides:

No, this isn't a rant lambasting the schism between the Dutch defence and attack. It's rather an observation on how the Russians are playing Dutch football better than the Dutch. Led by the Hague native Dick Advocaat, following Gus Hiddink's departure, this Russia side base their play on rapid passing and exhilarating counter attacks. The movement of this Russian side is rapid and thoughtful, as all the players are comfortable playing with each other (which is no surprise as so many play for Zenit or CSKA). 

Johan Cruijff has attacked Bert van Marwijk's tactics, critiscising his use of to similar players, Nigel de Jong and Mark van Bommel, as both don't pass the ball quickly enough to Sneijder or more creative players. Russia, however, with Denisov as a lone holding midfielder, circulate the ball more rapidly which always helps on counter attacks. While it is easy to criticise van Marwijk's tactics as the Netherlands lost to Denmark, the Dutch team created many chances, only to be spurned by van Persie or later Huntelaar.

The Influence of the Playmaker:

So far the most influential players of the tournament have been playmakers: Arshavin, Sneijder, Iniesta, Silva, Pirlo, Modric and Nasri all played exceptionally in their first games. One main reason why playmakers have flourished so much so far in this tournament is the widespread use of 4-2-3-1, which creates lots of opportunities and triangles for the attacking midfielder to pass through. All of these players see plenty of the ball and it is their responsibility to fashion attacks for their teams. For example, Wesley Sneijder was almost involved in every Dutch attack and created many chances, including one splendid through ball from the outside of his foot. Unfortunately for him, it was the wastefulness of the other Dutch players, especially van Persie and Robben, which resulted in a Danish victory.

A Great Tactical Battle:

Reading the team sheet for Spain - Italy was a shock. 4-6-0? Six central midfielders? 3-5-2? De Rossi at centre back? Giaccherini starting? When learning of this news, I was excited - no team had taken this sort of risk so far in the tournament. I started pacing up and down like a madman in anticipation of this match. It didn't dissapoint.

The reasons behind Italy playing 3-5-2 were simple. Spain, for all their attacking prowess, always play through the middle. They lack width. What's the point of playing full-backs? Furthermore, De Rossi has enough defensive ability to play centre-back in a back three. The main issue with playing De Rossi at the back is his positional sense and ability to keep an offside line. Italy, however, defended deep against Spain and gave De Rossi the role of a sweeper, so positioning was not as important. As a result, he played really well. 

In addition, Italy could stretch Spain with a midfield five. Giaccherini and Maggio played on the byline and prevented Jordi Alba or Arbeloa from coming too far forward. Spain, narrow enough with six central midfielders, now couldn't rely on forward runs from their full backs. Giaccherini and Maggio also gave quick options for counter attacks, orchestrated by the majestic Pirlo.

With six central midfielders, as you would imagine, Spain dominated possession and kept the ball. Vincent Del Bosque gave plenty of freedom to this six and let them play to their natural abilities as all are clever players and know where to be. This resulted in lots of movement and switches between the players, e.g. as Iniesta moved to the centre, Fabregas moved left. Spain, however, couldn't penetrate into the penalty area as Italy were defending deep and Spain had difficulty creating chances, relying on their pure abilities, not tactics in order to score. When Del Bosque put Torres and Jesus Navas on the pitch, however, the game was stretched a lot more and if not for Torres' poor decision making up front, they would have won the game. While Torres didn't take the chances given to him, he terrorised the Italy defence who now had genuine pace to worry about, meaning their positioning, which they had earlier neglected slightly, was of vital importance.

It will be interesting to see whether these two teams carry on with these formations as they only featured in this match. Italy's 3-5-2 seemed reactive to Spain's style of play so it is probable that it won't feature in the rest of the tournament. Del Bosque, however, seemed content with his formation and it could be their starting formation for the rest of the tournament. This is despite the fact that Spain looked more dangerous with a genuine striker and winger.

The Lone British Isles:

Is it a coincidence that the only two sides that use a traditional 4-4-2 are the two countries separated by the Irish Sea? Both teams can't afford to play expansive, possession based football as their managers realise their technical limitations. Both teams lack a playmaker and instead have to play a rigid, organised formation that suits their strengths. One of the greatest peculiarities in modern football is that England have failed to produce an international-level playmaker since Paul Gascoigne. There is hope yet for the English, if the potential of playmakers Jack Wilshere and Josh McEachran are realised. Until then, midfielders such as Jordan Henderson need to play for the national team.

One thing that surprised me in Ireland's game against Croatia (apart from the lapses of concentration by the Irish) was the substitution of Cox for McGeady in the 54th minute. At three-one down, players such as McGeady, who is the greatest creative talent in this generation of Irish footballers, are needed in order to score goals and create chances. Furthermore, McGeady had a decent game, setting up Ireland's lone goal, which made his sacrifice for a less talented Cox even more bemusing.

Very Premature Team of Euro 2012:

                                          Andersen (DEN)

Debuchy (FRA)       De Rossi (ITA)               Hummels (DEU)      Zhirkov (RUS)

                         Schweinsteiger (DEU)       Pirlo (ITA)

Iniesta (ESP)                          Sneijder (NED)                       Arshavin (RUS)

                                            Shevchenko (UKR)

Sunday, 26 February 2012

Talent Scout: The Best of Borussia Mönchengladbach

Something is amiss in Germany. Borussia Mönchengladbach, Germany's team of the '70s, are in second place. Borussia Mönchengladbach, the team that thwarted perhaps the greatest Bayern Munich side from winning consecutive titles with Beckenbauer, are ahead of the Bavarians. Borussia Mönchengladbach, the team that hasn't won the Bundesliga since 1977 and were relegated in 2007, have a realistic chance of winning the Bundesliga. But why are doing so well? Perhaps these two young players can help answer that question.


Marco Reus:




Name: Marco Reus
D.O.B.: 31/09/1989
Age: 22
P.O.B.: Dortmund, Germany
Position: Striker, Right Midfielder
Club: Borussia Mönchengladbach (Will join Borussia Dortmund in the summer)
National Team: Germany
Previous Clubs: Rot Weiss Ahlen, Borussia Dortmund (youth)


It is somewhat fitting that Marco Reus, a Dortmund native, will return back to the club that rejected him as a 17 year old. Rejected by Borussia Dortmund for being too small, Reus left his boyhood club for Rott-Weiss Ahlen, whom he led to the 2. Bundesliga. 


A successful season in Germany's second tier for Ahlen left Borussia Mönchengladbach intrigued, a club who's best player, Marko Marin, was on the verge of signing for Werder Bremen. Reus was a similar player to Marin, both wingers, both sporting blonde hair and they shared the same first name. Hence, it was natural to see Reus as the replacement for Marin.


Reus, however, exceeded expectations and became a better player than Marko Marin, who had stalled somewhat in Bremen. Reus then exploded this year and is now arguably the best player in the Bundesliga. Starting off as a right midfielder in a 4-4-2, Reus has transformed into a creative striker playing behind his frontline partner Mike Hanke. While Hanke is the goalscorer, Reus has thrived as a creator, not only setting up goals for others, but scoring also. 


As with every young German who has emerged in the Bundesliga, Reus' name was etched into Bayern Munich's transfer list and many believed he was on the verge of joining Borussia's rivals. Thus, it came as a shock when Reus denounced Bayern Munich and elected to join Borussia Dortmund, his former club, for €17.5 million. 


While Reus has played as a 'false nine' for Mönchengladbach, he may have to find his way out wide in a very talented Dortmund side. With Götze, Kagawa and Lewandowski already established at the club, Reus may have to find his place up front in a 4-2-3-1. Whether Dortmund choose to change their formation to suit Reus' talents or whether they will try to find a place for Reus in their already established side, Reus is likely to form a formidable partnership with Mario Götze and will look to re-astablish Borussia Dortmund as the best team in Germany for many years to come.

Strengths:
  • An intelligent footballer, Reus makes the right pass at the right time
  • Is a great through ball passer and can anticipate the runs of his teammates, thus creating plenty of scoring chances
  • Reus is very patient with the ball and won't force the ball forward, rather waiting for the best opportunity to spark an attack
  • Can be a creative spark when in need of a goal
  • When playing out wide, Reus is dangerous cutting inside and often looks to shoot into the near bottom corner
  • Has a soft first touch and can control the ball in tight spaces
  • Can change pace quickly and has a nice burst of acceleration
  • While finishing, Reus tends to place the ball into the corner
  • Is an adept set piece taker - can take corners
Weaknesses:

  • Can overdribble the ball, hangs onto it for too long
  • Isn't that skilled as a dribbler, relies more on his acceleration
  • Can improve his long passing; this will create more chances for his teammates
The Statistics:
  • Reus averages a stellar 3.1 dribbles per game
  • Reus also averages 2.5 key passes per game, a great number for a striker
  • His 1.9 tackles per game are also fantastic for a striker and exemplify his terrific work rate
  • Since his move to the striker position, Reus has scored 11 goals and assisted 5 times in 13 games
  • This compares favourably to 2 goals and no assists in 8 games as a right midfielder

Marc-André ter Stegen:


Name: Marc-André ter Stegen
D.O.B.: 30/04/1992
Age: 19
P.O.B.: Mönchengladbach, Germany
Position: Goalkeeper
Club: Borussia Mönchengladbach
National Team: Germany U19
Previous Clubs: N/A


While Marco Reus is returning back home, Marc-André ter Stegen is already at his childhood club. From Mönchengladbach, Ter Stegen played for Borussia since the age of four and has progressed up the youth system.


Earmarked as a great goalkeeping prospect from an early age, Ter Stegen broke into the Borussia first team in April last year and hasn't yet relinquished his role. At only 19, Ter Stegen has plenty of time to improve as a goalkeeper and will provide stiff competition to Manuel Neuer as Germany's number 1.  


Strengths:

  • A great shot stopper, Ter Stegen uses his frame well
  • Ter Stegen has great goal-kicks, which combine distance with accuracy
  • He is adept at playing a sweeper role, which encourages any team that he plays for to play a high line
  • Has a strong hand, can palm shots away from danger
  • Ter Stegen is a vocal goalkeeper and can organise and inspire his defence
Weaknesses:
  • His handling could be improved to stop any rebounding goals
  • Needs to refine his positioning
The Statistics:
  • Ter Stegen averages a mammoth 13.4 long balls per game, which is the highest amount of any player in the top five leagues. Furthermore, he is completing them at a 58% completion rate 

Saturday, 4 February 2012

The Re-Birth of the Back Three

Football formations go through eras and periods of time where they are extensively used; since the mid-noughties, the 4-5-1 and its variants (including the 4-2-3-1) rule the roost, monopolizing football at the highest levels. Eventually, however, it will be confined to history, much like many other tactics. The 2-3-5 had its day, however long ago, and has been banished as a relic of the sport's early days. Herbert Chapman's revered WM formation, the cornerstone of war time football, is know only found in history books. And indeed the 3-5-2, the dominant tactic of the late '80s and early '90s, seemed to be dying out with many people questioning its suitability in modern football.


Developed by Carlos Bilardo, manager of Argentina's 1986 World Cup winning squad, the 3-5-2 not only suited an Diego Maradona-led attack, but also proved to be defensively stable. The back three were organised so two of the centre backs man marked the opposition forwards, leaving one centre back, the libero or sweeper, to be free to sweep up any opposition balls and dribble forward. The new formation spread like wildfire across Europe and beyond until it was extinguished by Arrigo Sacchi, a bald shoe-salesman. After becoming the Milan coach in 1986, he enlightened the world to the merits of pressing and zonal marking with a back four, which is still in use today.


The 3-5-2 then teetered on the precipice of tactics history and became used less due to the emergence of the 4-5-1. A working back three relied on the opponent fielding two forwards, as then they would have one spare man at the back. With only one forward needing to be marked, however, the other two centrebacks had no role to do and this led to a shortfall of players further up the pitch. The 3-5-2 became out of date, just as the Sony Walkman and '70s football shorts.


Somehow, the back three has recently lifted itself up off the precipice and has fled to the safety of Italy, the birthplace of catennacio, the homeland of conservative football and the desolate land bereft of wingers. Udinese, Parma, Siena, Napoli, Lecce and more recently Fiorentina have been employing it, whilst Juventus have been flirting with it, looking for nothing more than a one-night stand. Bielsa and his disciple Sampaoli have also been using it and the 3-5-2 has emerged as the staple diet of Chilean football. But why has it emerged, and what are the consequences of its revival?


Let's start in Italy. Delio Rossi replaced Siniša Mihajlović (who's every mention conjures up these highlights) in November and has since managed a strong Fiorentina defence; they are currently second last in the number of goals conceded, despite being eleventh in the table. Delio Rossi has also changed Fiorentina formation to the 3-5-2 and it has suited them well. While Valon Behrami has been transformed into a defensive midfielder and leads Serie A in tackles per game, Fiorentina's back three has also shone. In Gamberini, Natali and Nastasić, Fiorentina have three centre backs who are all comfortable on the ball and they have starred this season.


With the re-emergence of the back three, one centre back has remained free while playing against two forwards. In comparison to the 3-5-2's glory days, this spare man is more of a passer than a dribbler and mirrors the game's switch to passing football inspired by the successes of Spain and Barcelona. In addition, it is Barcelona who have also experimented with the position, and have used the spare man to full effect. Usually one of Busquets or Mascherano have dropped back to the back three for the Catalan side. With the employment of a defensive midfielder in the back three, Barcelona can retain the possession of the ball more easily. Against Villarreal in their La Liga opener, Guardiola even fielded both Mascherano and Busquets in defence. A back three suits teams with ball playing defenders such as Hummels and Alderweireld.

Another team who have had success with a back three is Universidad de Chile, who have swept all before them in South America. Unlike other teams that play with a back three, Universidad employ aggressive pressing, prioritising winning the ball high up the pitch. Another Bielsa-inspired feature of their play is the use of wingers high up the pitch. The wide-forwards of Vargas and Castro stretch out the opposition back line, thus creating space for them to exploit with their pace. Eduardo Vargas in particular has impressed, becoming the single competition top scorer in Copa Sudamerica history and securing a move to Napoli after rejecting Chelsea's advances. While full-backs nowadays have a greater attacking responsibility, as it is hard to mark their advances from deep, wingers occupy the defence and thus manipulate the space around them. Barcelona have used this to great effect, playing Sanchez (a player used to Bielsa's tactics) and Pedro high up wide, thus creating space for Messi to create chances in his false nine role. 


In utilising a back three, teams can employ a variety of tactics. Some, like Fiorentina have created a great defensive team by using the extra centre back to their advantage. Some, like Universidad de Chile use it so that they can press the ball high up the pitch and start counter-attacks. Others, like Barcelona and Juventus, have used it in certain situations against certain opponents, to ensure they have the upper hand. No matter how it is employed, the 3-5-2 certainly isn't dead. Instead, it is alive and kicking.